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CODIB-D-111/1.7/5
13 April 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: CODIB Members

**SUBJECT: Final Report of Task Team VII - Analyst
Communication**

1. Attached is a revised Final Report of Task Team VII - Analyst Communication. Within a few days we shall begin drafting a CODIB cover report to USIB on this. It would be helpful to us in drafting this cover report if you would let us know the following:

a. Are there any of the recommendations of the Task Team (see pp 14-15) that you do not wish CODIB to endorse?

b. Are there any other recommendations that you wish to include in the CODIB cover report?

2. If we have not heard from you by CoB 21 April, we shall assume that your answer is negative to these two questions.


Secretary

Attachment: As stated

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19 April 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Holders of CODIB-D-111/1.7/5

SUBJECT: Corrected Page 14 to CODIB-D-111/1.7/5,
7 April 1967

Attached is a corrected page 14 to the Final Report of Task Team VII - Analyst Communication (CODIB-D-111/1.7/5). Please remove and destroy old page 14 and replace it with the attached page.


Secretary

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Attachment: A/S

*new page filed
in here.*

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CODIB-D-111/1.7/5
7 April 1967

U N I T E D S T A T E S I N T E L L I G E N C E B O A R D
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

TASK TEAM VII - ANALYST COMMUNICATION

FINAL REPORT

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Group 1
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declassification.

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CODIB-D-111/1.7/5
7 April 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
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
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Committee on Documentation

SUBJECT : Final Report of CODIB Task Team VII, Analyst
Communication

1. Transmitted herewith is the report of Task Team VII, Analyst Communication.

2. It will be noted that the Task Team concludes that the situation with respect to analyst-to-analyst communication is more satisfactory than had first been presumed when the Task Team was constituted. This generally, more satisfactory situation, it is believed, can be attributed to the increasing maturity and sophistication of the intelligence community in general, to the strengthening, over the past years, of the various organs of coordination, particularly USIB and its committees, and to a growing realization on the part of each agency of the benefits to be derived from cooperation and collaboration. It is primarily these factors, rather than the existence or non-existence of specific facilities, that govern the extent and effectiveness of analyst-to-analyst communication. However, there are a few areas where improvement can be accomplished. These have been indicated in the report. The Task Team is especially hopeful that newly reported developments may prove of real assistance in reducing the problem of secure voice communications.

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Chairman

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CODIB-D-111/1.7/5
7 April 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

TASK TEAM VII - ANALYST COMMUNICATION

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Terms of Reference

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A. Scope of the Problem

1. In accordance with its Terms of Reference (CODIB-D-111/1.7/2), Task Team VII considered the problem of communication between analysts who, in their respective agencies, are engaged in the production and coordination of positive intelligence. It did not address itself to the problems of communication between analysts in different components of the same agency or to ways and means of improving communication between intelligence analysts and collectors* or between intelligence analysts and operations and policy elements in other agencies.

2. In approaching its problem, the Task Team initially sought to obtain an understanding of the actual, present situation with respect to analyst-to-analyst communication. Since actual day to day practices are greatly affected by the working habits of analysts and are, to a high degree, subjective matters, a comprehensive survey of all analysts concerned, through a questionnaire technique, was considered not warranted. Instead, the Task Team members discussed analyst-to-analyst communications with representative analysts in their respective agencies. These personal interviews were guided by a series of questions which the Task Team had developed in advance.

3. The intelligence organizations thus surveyed were the producing organizations in Washington, D.C., specifically: the research offices in INR, most of the offices under the DDI in CIA, and elements of DIA under the Assistant Director for Intelligence Production. For practical reasons, the Task Team concentrated on a single geographical area (viz., Latin America) and discussed all aspects of analyst communication with a substantial number of individuals working in this field. However, it also discussed the problem of improving analyst-to-analyst communication with a broad spectrum of intelligence officers in other geographic and functional areas and took their views into account in preparing this report. Total coverage, in the view of Task Team VII and of the officers consulted, was sufficiently inclusive to validate the views set forth herein.

B. Purposes Served by Analyst-to-Analyst Communication

1. Analysts in one agency communicate with analysts in another agency for two major purposes: (a) to exchange views and judgments and (b) to obtain information. Both purposes may be involved in any particular instance of analyst-to-analyst communication.

*It should also be noted that, by its Terms of Reference, Task Team VII is not concerned with problems of information handling, processing, identification, recording, storage, and retrieval.

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2. When analysts communicate to exchange views and judgments they are usually concerned with current developments, but from time to time they also discuss other topics of mutual interest. In either case, the analysts are typically "opposite numbers" or counterparts--that is, they work in essentially the same area or functional specialty in their respective agencies and are familiar with the current information pertaining to their specialty. Thus, communication is generally initiated to get a counterpart's interpretation of the facts, or to check one's own interpretation, rather than to acquire additional data or background information.

3. Communication for the second purpose, i.e., to obtain information, on the other hand, usually involves analysts working in different areas or specialties. For example, a political analyst may need detailed information about military matters or a Latin American specialist may require statistical data which other agencies regularly compile. When an analyst needs information on a subject outside his field he initially seeks assistance from his colleagues in his own agency, but in many cases he knows in advance that the kind of information sought can be obtained only from knowledgeable officers in other agencies. The information itself is sometimes obtained orally, in which case analyst-to-analyst communication has served its purpose without any documents being obtained; however, communication may also be little more than an inquiry about the information sought and the information itself may be acquired in the form of a memorandum prepared specifically for the purpose of answering the inquiry or by reference to documents which the analyst obtains through normal channels.

4. The Task Team found that analyst-to-analyst communication is generally not undertaken to avoid duplication of effort. In the current intelligence field, analysts recognize that each agency will decide whether or not to publish its interpretation of current events on grounds other than the avoidance of duplication. It is established practice, of course, for designated intelligence officers to coordinate items in the daily issuances of the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA with their opposite numbers, but communication between analysts for the express purpose of obtaining formal concurrence on a current intelligence topic is otherwise very rare. Moreover, informal communication between analysts is not the normal procedure for producing a coordinated intelligence estimate or an agreed judgment. The well-known mechanisms for producing NIEs and USIB Committee papers may involve analyst communication in an incidental way, but the group discussion of a common draft, in this context, is primarily for coordination purposes and not for the type of analyst communication that is addressed in this report.

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C. Existing Practices and Facilities

1. There is considerable variation in the extent to which analysts know their counterparts in other agencies, and various other intelligence officers, who are sources of information in related fields. As a general rule, those who have been in intelligence for many years have a wide range of contacts whereas those who are relatively new do not. However, much depends on the characteristic habits, and particular circumstances of the individuals involved.

2. Contacts are sometimes established through one or more of the intelligence community mechanisms--e.g., the USIB substantive committees, meetings of representatives on NIEs, coordination of the Central Intelligence Agency's daily and special issuances, various task teams set up from time to time, and the NIS program. But to a large extent, analysts develop their contacts on an individual basis, often on their own initiative and sometimes aided by suggestions from their predecessors, colleagues, or immediate superiors.

3. An analyst who wishes to communicate with an analyst in another agency has available to him a number of facilities to assist in effecting such communication. Most obvious, of course, is the telephone (black and gray). To supplement the telephone, there are secure teletype links between the agencies, and the LDX which connects NSA, the operation centers of CIA and State, and the National Military Command Center (NMCC). The analyst can also call upon established liaison services for assistance in establishing the desired contact.

4. Both the frequency and agency pattern of analyst-to-analyst communication vary markedly. For example, most INR offices tend to have more contact with CIA components than with DIA, some rarely consult with CIA analysts except those in OCI, and in a few instances it was said that the initiative was more often taken by OCI. In part, this pattern reflects the fact that interagency communication occurs more frequently for the purpose of exchanging views with opposite numbers on current intelligence matters relating to an analyst's primary field. When the purpose is getting timely information on matters outside of an analyst's primary field, the agencies and persons contacted vary considerably, depending on the particular subject in question.

5. The extent and frequency of analyst-to-analyst communication also vary markedly with the intensity of activity in a given area or subject and the interest shown in such activity by higher authority. When activity and interest are at a high pitch, as, for example, in the case of the Dominican Republic crisis, or with regard to Communist China,

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analyst-to-analyst communication takes place constantly. On the other hand, in areas or subjects which are quiescent, analyst-to-analyst communication may be very infrequent. This is, of course, perfectly normal behavior. It does, however, point up the fact that under circumstances in which analyst-to-analyst communication is important, present facilities do suffice to establish and maintain such communication, and conversely, in those instances where analyst-to-analyst communication is infrequent or absent, it is likely that such communication is not necessary, even though it may be in general terms, desirable.

6. Communication is usually by phone. In many cases there is insufficient time to go to another agency to discuss current developments and, when information is sought, it is typically needed very promptly. However, much depends on the habits of the individuals involved. Thus, a small proportion of the analysts make a point of meeting with their counterparts periodically to discuss matters of mutual interest, including current intelligence items, while others expressed the hope that circumstances would permit more informal exchange of ideas but felt that the pressure of work always interfered. The nature of an analyst's job also has a direct bearing on his communication practices. Economists, for example, tend to maintain contact with a large number of individuals in both intelligence and non-intelligence agencies, and to communicate with them by phone not so much because of the pressure of time but rather because that method is the most efficient way of getting bits and pieces from widely scattered sources.

7. Liaison arrangements tend to be used more for document procurement than for establishing contact with knowledgeable individuals in other agencies. In this connection, analysts felt that improvement was needed in facilities for rapid document transmission and some expressed the hope that the LDX system would eventually permit rapid transmission of facsimiles throughout the intelligence community. It was noted that analysts frequently need to see actual documents in order to discuss matters effectively over the phone, that reading excerpts from documents is often impractical, and that teletype transmission for this purpose is cumbersome.

D. Impediments to Analyst Communication

1. Although virtually every aspect of analyst-to-analyst communication can be improved in some respect, the Task Team found that existing practices were actually working better than was initially expected. The principal impediments appear to be the differences, and

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changes, in the organization structures of the intelligence agencies, difficulties in utilizing available secure communications facilities, and the pressure of work loads. A lesser impediment arises from security considerations discussed in paragraph 5.

2. Organizational differences complicate identifying appropriate officers in other agencies. INR is organized on a geographic basis; DIA's production element is organized both geographically and functionally; and CIA's production element is organized partly on a geographic basis and partly functionally. The Task Team found, for example, that analysts in INR and their geographically organized counterparts in CIA are for the most part well known to each other. Similarly, where DIA and CIA have comparable functional elements (e.g., the Military Economics Division in DIA and the Military Economic Research Area in CIA) the analysts know their counterparts and contact them directly whenever circumstances warrant doing so. They sometimes need assistance when their counterparts are not available, when they need to direct their inquiry through the chain of command, and when they seek information in fields which neither the analyst nor his counterpart follows in depth. Differences in organizational structure also make it difficult to determine who is the counterpart of a division or branch chief and whether there are several components of another agency that might profitably be contacted. Finally, the new analyst often needs assistance in identifying both his counterparts and sources of information in other agencies. The latter problem is essentially an internal matter, but the Task Team believes it would be useful to encourage agencies to invite officers from other departments to attend periodic briefings on their organization and functions.

3. The Task Team found that most analysts preferred to communicate by personal face-to-face discussion. There was agreement, however, that time and distance factors greatly limited the opportunities for personal meetings, and that reliance must be placed on mechanical means, primarily on the telephone. The ordinary black phone should not, of course, be used for any classified discussions or to transmit classified information; yet it is well known that the black phone is widely and extensively used to discuss classified matters. On the other hand, the black phone system is the only system that is fully accessible to analysts. Moreover, the present, existing secure telephone systems are far more sophisticated than the analysts require under normal circumstances. Their needs for the most part can be met by some system that will enable communication no higher than SECRET.

4. The NSA secure telephone (known as the gray phone system) which is used to discuss Special Intelligence, is employed as a means of analyst-to-analyst communication. However, this system is limited in

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scope, and access to it requires a special clearance which numerous analysts, particularly in the intelligence research area (INR) of State and the Defense Intelligence Agency do not have. Teletype links and LDX are occasionally used for analyst-to-analyst communication, especially in a "crisis" situation when responsible analysts are physically present in their respective operations centers. For day-to-day communication between analysts, however, these mechanisms are cumbersome and time consuming, and necessitate the analyst leaving his desk and files. Moreover, with respect to the LDX, intelligence use of the system must give ground to priority operational use.

5. The Task Team found that security consideration constituted another factor inhibiting analyst-to-analyst communication. The obvious security considerations--i.e., the level and type of clearance another analyst possesses--can be dealt with, albeit with some delay, through normal security channels. In some areas, for example among analysts working on Latin America, this is a relatively minor problem, since specially compartmented intelligence of various kinds contributes less significantly in this area than in others. Analysts have expressed concern, however, over the problem of "sensitive" material which, although not specially classified, is given limited and restricted dissemination. State "LIMDIS" cables, CIA's Intelligence Information Special Report and "Exclusive For" reports are examples of this type of material. There is no ready means by which an analyst in State can know whether the analyst he wishes to consult in CIA or DIA has seen, or is authorized to be informed of, an important "LIMDIS" cable. Obviously, in some circumstances, this kind of uncertainty reduces the usefulness of analyst-to-analyst communication and consultation.

6. The Task Team has the impression, from its survey, that apart from the inadequacy of the existing telephone system, the greatest impediment to analyst-to-analyst communication is simply the work load and time factor. Again and again analysts acknowledged the desirability of more frequent consultation with their opposite numbers in other agencies, but confessed that they could not spare the time and effort.

7. In summary, the Task Team found that:

a. Present facilities and procedures do, in fact, enable an analyst in one agency to identify and make contact with an analyst in another agency.

b. Present facilities and procedures, however, are in some instances, cumbersome, and time consuming; and the cumulative effect of these inadequacies does act as a definite impediment to useful analyst-to-analyst communication.

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c. The two areas in which improvements should be sought are (1) means of identifying analysts by knowledgeability and areas of responsibility; (2) means of augmenting secure telephone or other types of oral communication facilities.

E. Possible Means of Improvement

1. Identification of Appropriate Analysts in Other Agencies

a. The Terms of Reference for Task Team VII directed it "to determine, inter alia, the feasibility of establishing a centralized intelligence community directory service as an aid in any program for improvement." In its exploration of this matter, the Task Team made the following assumptions concerning such a directory service:

(1) The directory service would function in a manner analogous to a telephone information service rather than take the form of a published directory.

(2) The directory service would cover INR and the production elements of DIA and CIA. Because of security and other complications, NSA would not be included initially, nor would other production offices located outside the Washington area, such as FTD.

(3) The Register would be organized on the basis of subject specialization, and show, for each subject, the appropriate analyst in each agency, his telephone number (gray and/or black), his organizational location and his office address.

(4) The analyst identified for each subject specialty would be the responsible analyst, rather than the most knowledgeable. In the great majority of cases, the responsible analyst is the most knowledgeable. The exceptions to this generalization would be extremely difficult to identify, and even when identified, there would remain administrative and perhaps security complications if an analyst in one agency were able to deal directly with the most knowledgeable but not responsible individual in another agency.

b. A number of problems arise in connection with a directory service of the general character indicated above.

(1) The directory will necessarily be organized by subject. There are, however, inconsistencies among the agencies as to nomenclature of subjects, and as to the degree to which subject fields

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are subdivided. It is possible, of course, to devise a subject breakdown for the proposed Register which would make provision for the variations among agencies, through cross references, special subdivisions, etc. The servicing of inquiries to the directory, however, would probably require an individual at least of junior professional grade who was thoroughly familiar with the details of the subject arrangements of the Register, and the internal organization of the agencies concerned.

(2) If it is to be useful, the directory must be kept current, not only in respect to reassignments of individuals, but also as to reorganizations in the agencies, changes in responsibilities, physical moves, and changes in telephone numbers. On the basis of the difficulties encountered in maintaining the normal telephone information service, which is concerned only with individuals on a name basis, it will be a formidable task to ensure the necessary discipline and promptness on the part of the various agencies in providing the needed data. Without such discipline and promptness, a directory service would lose much of its usefulness.

(3) A directory service as outlined in paragraph 1 above raises security problems both in CIA and DIA. Informal conversations with CIA's Office of Security indicate that, from a security point of view, approval would not be given to a directory service of the kind described above which would service all inquiries received on the unclassified (black) telephone. The alternatives appear to be (1) to provide service to inquiries on the gray (secure) phone only, and/or (2) to provide service only to specified points of contact in each of the agencies concerned. Either of these alternatives, or both, would in the view of the Task Team, considerably reduce the use of the directory service by analysts. All analysts who do not both possess the necessary special clearance and have access to a gray phone would be forced to go through third parties to obtain information from the directory service.

(4) The Task Team has attempted to arrive at a rough estimate of the cost of a directory service. The development of a suitable system of subject matter categories, the development of a satisfactory form to be used by the agencies in reporting their analysts both initially and on subsequent changes, and the collation and organization of the information, would, it is estimated, require the services of two professional and two clerical personnel for six months. Thereafter, the directory could be maintained and serviced by one professional and one clerical. Thus, in rough approximation, it will cost \$18,000 to establish a directory service, and \$18,000 per year to maintain and service it. Not included are indirect costs,

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e.g., preparation of reporting forms in the agencies concerned, overhead, hardware, etc. The above, in the view of the Task Team, is a minimum estimate; the actual direct cost might be considerably greater.

c. It should be noted that no enthusiasm for an interagency directory service was expressed by the analysts interviewed by the Task Team members; on the other hand, many of them felt that presently available facilities could be supplemented by better access to organization charts and to the telephone directories of the other agencies (particularly CIA). There is serious doubt, therefore, that a directory service would be used by analysts in preference to other available means for identifying and locating analysts in other agencies.

2. Augmenting Secure Telephone Facilities

a. Since so much analyst-to-analyst communication is conducted over the phone, it would be desirable to provide better facilities for discussing classified information. Ideally, every analyst should be able to discuss classified information over a secure phone located at his own desk, where he has ready access to his working files. A less ideal provision, but nonetheless, a very helpful one, would be one secure phone for each small group of analysts who normally work together--a section or subunit typically numbering, say, four-five analysts. If an analyst has to go to his Division Chief's Office or to a special area several hundred yards away from his desk to use a secure phone, a significant psychological impediment is created, in addition to the practical inconvenience to the analyst.

b. An obvious and attractive solution for most analyst-to-analyst communications problems would be to develop a small, reasonably priced device that could be attached to the existing, universally accessible, black telephone, to provide voice security through SECRET. The team found little evidence of technology trends or development plans that could lead to construction of such a device at reasonable cost and at the required miniaturization in the foreseeable future.

c. The Task Team investigated the possibility of adapting or extending existing secure telephone systems to accommodate the needs of analysts.

(1) With regard to the "gray" telephone system, it was found that little significant expansion would be possible for the following reasons:

(a) access to the gray system is limited to personnel possessing a special clearance which numerous analysts in INR and DIA do not possess;

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(b) security requirements limit the locations in which gray phones may be placed;

(c) installation of additional gray phones is physically difficult and very expensive, primarily because of the necessity to use special conduits for the lines and valuted areas for phone locations; and,

(d) circuits between agencies are in some instances already close to the limit of the capacity.

(2) Within CIA's Headquarters Building at Langley is a "red" automatic dial telephone system, secure through SECRET, which is available to virtually every analyst in the building. The security of this system, however, is dependent upon the fact that it has no electrical connection with any line running outside the building. To undertake to employ it as the basis for a secure interagency system, therefore, raises what appear to be virtually insurmountable technical and financial obstacles.

(3) A secure voice communication system based upon the KY-3, known as the "green" phone, is currently being installed in key Washington activities. Conversations classified through TOP SECRET can be carried on this system which will connect the White House, the CIA, the DoD, and the State Department. In addition to providing communications for vital command and policy decisions, it will serve as a means of secure voice communications among the major strategic intelligence and policy support activities. The Washington complex will be connected at the Pentagon with the world-wide Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) system being installed primarily for command and control purposes. There are now about 100 green phones in the CIA, about 30 in the State Department and about 220 are planned for the DoD agencies in the Washington area including DIA. Additional green phones are also planned for the CIA and State.

(4) Information furnished the team indicates that the secure voice communications system being developed for the Washington complex could theoretically meet the basic need for analyst-to-analyst communications within the intelligence community if the system were sufficiently expanded and the terminals properly located. The team understands that a call box similar to that used on ordinary black telephone lines can be installed at each KY-3 terminal and that seven additional lines can be extended from each call box. If one line is

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used for secretary call control and there is no analyst use of the original KY-3 phone, there would be a net increase of six secure phones per KY-3 terminal available in large measure, if not entirely, for analyst-to-analyst use. Current practice is to terminate the extensions fairly close to the KY-3 mainly because of physical area security considerations. However, the lines could be extended as far as 1,000 feet under appropriate physical area security conditions. Not all presently installed KY-3's are so located as to permit use for analyst-to-analyst communication; similarly, not all of the KY-3's soon-to-be installed will be so located. However, a case-by-case study appears to be warranted to select the best candidates for the attachment of call boxes and extensions to facilitate analyst use. Wherever this could be done, secure telephone service could be provided for 24-30 analysts from each KY-3, assuming four to five analysts would have access to each of the six additional phones. The cost for each call box, including the inter-connection, extension lines of moderate length and instruments, is about \$1800 plus line rental of about \$20 per month. Thus, the cost of extending this secure voice communication capability would be about \$60-\$75 per analyst, plus a line rental of less than \$1 per analyst per month. This cost seems very reasonable in relation to the potential value of the additional capacity for analyst-to-analyst communications. If in any agency there are not sufficient KY-3 terminals located so as to permit extension of lines into the analysts areas, or if they cannot be so located, some additional KY-3 terminals could be installed. This would increase the cost to about \$350-\$400 per analyst based on an estimated installation cost of \$10,000 per terminal plus \$1800 for the call box and extensions. The team understands, however, that there are technical factors which would preclude large-scale expansion of this system at this time without the expenditure of large sums of money.

(5) The team believes that providing extensions from selected KY-3's would significantly enhance the capability of a considerable number of analysts to communicate with one another, would make it possible to evaluate the importance and use of such communication facilities, and would provide the basis for future decisions regarding the extension and/or development of additional secure voice communications capabilities for analyst use.

d. The development of a new secure voice communications system is similar in many respects to that encountered in the development of a complex weapon system, i.e., the future requirement must be specified on a long-lead-time basis in order to take maximum advantage of advancing technologies and, once a program is committed to meet the specified requirement, it is very difficult and sometimes expensive to change the direction, pace and outcome. In light of this, the team believes that those responsible for the planning and development of secure voice

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communications systems should keep in mind the need for improved analyst-to-analyst communication. The team also believes that those responsible for major analytic activities should provide to the communication system planners whatever guidance they can on trends in the need for analyst-to-analyst communications. The team senses, without possessing detailed knowledge of the technical fields involved, that additional developments similar to the ones cited above regarding the KY-3 system may occur in communications technology or systems integration that could significantly affect prospects for further improvement in analyst-to-analyst communications.

e. A case at point exists in the emerging plan by the CIA to convert its existing gray and KY-3 secure voice telephone systems into an integrated secure voice communications system for command and control use, for analyst-to-analyst use, and for general purpose communications. The technical and security difficulties have already been surmounted and the sum of about \$70,000 has been approved for the purchase and installation of the master control switch in the CIA Headquarters building which would inter-connect the two systems. The envisaged integrated system would at minimum cost preserve the secure voice communications with the NSA via the gray phone system and at the same time permit maximum use of the expanding KY-3 system within the Washington headquarters and policy support activities. The integrated secure voice system in CIA Headquarters would work as follows:

Incoming calls from gray phone holders could go only to CIA gray phones.

Incoming calls from KY-3 systems could go through-out the headquarters building via either the green or the gray systems.

In the case of calls originating from CIA Headquarters the calls could stay within one system or cross over to the other at the caller's direction, except that KY-3 phones in CIA will be able to call through the gray system to NSA only if specially approved and wired.

However, in no case could callers into CIA buildings use the integrated system to switch outward, i.e., both gray phone calls and KY-3 calls would terminate within the CIA Headquarters building. This assures the necessary security of the gray telephone system at NSA insofar as spill-over of calls from uncleared people is concerned and leaves only the need for a gray phone user to be assured that a KY-3 user possesses proper clearances and has met the required physical security conditions. Under sponsorship of the SIGINT Committee of USIB, arrangements are being made for KY-3 holders in USIB member departments to be

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able to use a verbal "authentication code" to determine if the person answering the phone has the requisite clearances. The details and procedures for this remain to be worked out and, when completed, they may become the pattern for the development of any similarly integrated secure voice communications system involving the gray phones in other activities of the intelligence community.

f. The above illustrates the highly evolutionary nature of both the technologies and systems concepts affecting secure voice, and related communications, in the intelligence field. The team understands from those most informed in these matters that the next three to five years may see unprecedented progress in the field of secure communications, especially that part of direct concern to analyst-to-analyst communications. The foregoing underscores the importance of close and continuous liaison between those leaders responsible for major analytic activities and those responsible for the planning and development of secure voice systems and facilities directly related to analyst-to-analyst communications.

3. Use of Television Techniques

a. It has been suggested that closed circuit television techniques might be applicable to certain aspects of analyst-to-analyst communications, particularly in circumstances involving graphic, as opposed to documentary, information or presentation. The Department of Defense has utilized closed circuit television for briefing purposes, and in connection with certain command and control activities. CIA's Imagery Analysis Division (IAD) has developed a closed circuit TV technique for presenting various kinds of photography, using standard, commercially available components. Simply stated, a TV camera of the type used for educational TV purposes is coupled to a high quality microscope under which the photograph is placed. The resultant image obtained on the TV screen is enlarged and clear within the limitations of current commercial TV quality. The Task Team believes that this technique could be developed into a useful means whereby photo interpreters could quickly and effectively communicate with general analysts-- a process which now usually requires the analyst in person to visit the photo interpretation center. The technique may also have a useful application for briefing and for intercommunication purposes in certain types of crisis situations. The feasibility of the technique has been demonstrated by the work of the Imagery Analysis Division; its application, however, to real life situations will require further research. In particular, means for ensuring the security of the video signal, whether transmitted by cable or microwave, must be developed before the system can be used between buildings or agencies.

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F. Conclusions

On the basis of its surveys, investigations, and the considerations outlined in the previous paragraphs the Task Team has reached the following conclusions:

1. The variety of mechanisms presently existing provide a workable means for the establishment and maintenance of interagency analyst-to-analyst communication.
2. Liaison facilities can ensure--albeit, on occasion with some delay--that any analyst with a valid reason can identify and make contact with the appropriate analyst in another agency.
3. In total, present mechanisms and facilities for analyst-to-analyst communication are reasonably adequate; however, significant improvements could be made: (a) by providing more ready means for identifying and locating the appropriate analyst in another agency; and (b) by providing additional secure telephone facilities for analyst-to-analyst consultation.
4. Augmentation of existing or planned KY-3 (green) telephone facilities in the Washington area would satisfy a significant portion of the present need for analyst-to-analyst communication facilities at reasonable cost.

G. Recommendations

The Task Team recommends:

1. That CIA, on a periodic basis, make available to other members of the intelligence community listings of its key analytical or production people, both area and functional.
2. That DIA and State make available to other members of the community increased numbers of their current telephone directories so as to make available one copy to each small group of analysts who work together.
3. That DIA, CIA and Department of State make available to each other, on a periodic basis, copies of their organization charts in sufficient detail to make evident the analytical capabilities of major units and subunits in the positive intelligence field.
4. That member agencies participating in the green secure voice communications system examine the locations of existing and planned

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KY-3 terminals and, wherever warranted and feasible, add a call box and extend the additional telephone lines thus provided into appropriate areas so as to improve analyst-to-analyst communications capabilities.

5. That member agencies assure the continuing participation by managers of the major analysis organizations in the planning activities of the people concerned with the development and installation of secure voice communications equipment and systems so that analyst-to-analyst communication capabilities may be improved in the future to the maximum feasible extent.

6. That development be continued on closed circuit television techniques such as those already initiated by the CIA Imagery Analysis Division, with particular attention to solving the security problems involved in using this technique between agencies, and that CIA serve as executive agent for this development.

7. That Task Team VII be dissolved.

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APPENDIX
CODIB-D-111/1.7/2
12 May 1965

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

TASK TEAM VII - ANALYST COMMUNICATION

Terms of Reference

I. OBJECTIVES

A. To study present practices and procedures in the field of intelligence analyst-to-analyst communications to ascertain whether improvement is required; and, if required, to develop proposals to facilitate the exchange between analysts of substantive information and personal judgment and expertise.

B. To determine, inter alia, the feasibility of establishing a centralized intelligence community directory service as an aid in any program for improvement.

II. SCOPE

A. All intelligence producing components of USIB agencies that produce finished intelligence, basic, current, or estimative are within the scope of this problem. Organizations under contract to a USIB agency, non-USIB elements, or the Unified and Specified Commands and their components are not included at this time, but the Task Team should recommend whether these should be included in a subsequent phase.

B. Analysts performing current, basic, and estimative intelligence analysis are to be included.

C. With regard to a centralized intelligence community directory service, the work of Task Team VII should supplement rather than duplicate the work of Task Team IX.

D. All practical communications methods, including voice, image and message transmission at all appropriate security levels should be considered in connection with the improvement of analyst-to-analyst communication.

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Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

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APPENDIX

III. TASKS

- A. Identify all organizations within the scope of the problem.
- B. Identify and describe existing practices, procedures, and facilities for analyst-to-analyst communication.
- C. Determine need for improvement in communications between analysts in these organizations.
- D. Determine and describe various procedures and facilities that could be utilized to meet a need for enhanced communications between analysts.
- E. Identify procedures and facilities to be adopted to provide the necessary improvement of communications, including appropriate equipment and the location thereof.
- F. Determine methods and feasibility of collecting, publishing and maintaining data that would facilitate analyst-to-analyst communication, including identification of each.
- G. Prepare appropriate recommendation to CODIB on the foregoing.

IV. MEMBERSHIP

A member familiar with intelligence production practices and procedures should be designated by each USIB agency. Other agencies may be invited to participate if the Task Team believes they have an ability to contribute to the effort. Members will require appropriate^{1/} security clearances and should have broad knowledge of intelligence analysis activities within their respective agencies. The CODIB Support Staff will provide a member who will also act as Secretary.

^{1/} See CODIB-M-59, paragraph 5.

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APPENDIX

V. GUIDANCE

A. This Task Team will be under the general guidance of CODIB. The Chief of the CODIB Support Staff will coordinate the work of this Task Team with the work of other Task Teams and will provide continuity of guidance in between the CODIB meetings.

B. In approaching its assigned tasks, this Task Team should take into consideration:

1. Advantages of improved analyst-to-analyst communications such as

- a. Cross-fertilization
- b. Making available unique information, knowledge or expertise
- c. Avoidance of duplicatory research

2. Disadvantages and dangers such as

- a. "False" coordination
- b. Bypassing command channels and command control
- c. Premature revelation of policy
- d. Breakdown of security

3. Operational problems such as

- a. Identification of right individual
- b. Locating individual
- c. Physical means of contact--personal visit, telephone, gray line, etc.
- d. Determination of security clearance (two way)
- e. Discussion of controlled info-Limdis, Exdis, CS-DB, etc.
- f. Encouragement of analyst-to-analyst communication.

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